RICHARD MIDDLETON -- Ph.D. – Professor at Queen's University, Belfast
Dear Dr. Kolkey,
I agree that factional self interest in the Eighteenth Century is often the key, as Sir Lewis Namier demonstrated, to most political decisions, including those of war. But self interest, as you say, takes many forms; namely financial gain, family honor, and personal aggrandisement. Perhaps the most conspicuous example among the latter was William Pitt, Senior, who along with the other "Cobham Cubs" drove Walpole into war with Spain simply to secure office....
Yours sincerely,
Richard Middleton
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EVELYN CRUICKSHANKS -- Ph.D. – Professor at University of London
You are right about factional politics....
When the Elector of Hanover succeeded as George I in 1714, all Tories were purged from office and Britain became a one-party state, a situation which George II continued. Walpole did not want to go to war in 1739 as he always thought this would give the Jacobites and some Powers an opportunity to restore the Stuarts. He was forced into war by opposition Whigs, after Spanish gold and trade to South America, and the Tories who wanted to restore the Stuarts. George I and George II were absentee kings who spent six month out of the year in Hanover and pursued a foreign policy to favour Hanoverian interests. British troops were sent to serve in Continental Europe while foreign mercenaries were quartered in England....
Best wishes
Eveline Cruckshanks
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HAMISH SCOTT -- Ph.D. -- Professor at University of St. Andrews
Curiously enough, Professor Scott agrees with me only regarding several Hanoverian-era British wars. Indeed I have frequently encountered British historians who adhere to their individual "set" of such wars -- either pro or con involving my thesis.
Dear Professor Kolkey,
I'm sorry to have taken so long to get back to you: a combination of being away,
packing up to go home, and wanting to think about the important points you
raise.
Where I largely agree is the case of the 1739 war with Spain, where the problems
of Walpole himself and pressure from the city of London merchants who were
suffering at the hands of Spanish guardacostas did much to bring on war - not
everything, as the Spanish seem to have decided to fight rather than settle, as
far as I can remember. There is an excellent study (1998, London) by Philip
Woodfine entitled *Britannia's Glories*, which you might find interesting and
which would offer significant support for your position.
I don't think you can maintain that 1689 or 1702 are this kind of war: the
former is surely an intervention of the Dutch Stadtholder William III to
prevent Britain being added to the ranks of his enemies as he prepared to fight
Louis XIV, while 1702 is about Spanish and Austrian refusal to accept the
partition settlement which the Anglo-Dutch alliance and France had agreed upon:
all the evidence is that Britain, like France wanted to avoid war. 1780 is not
about North wanting to extend the conflict (the Dutch had a decent navy, or so
the British thought) as about British attempts to influence the Dutch political
conflict. Pitt in 1754 is surely not yet a member of the ministry, while in 1762
Pitt was opposed by his cabinet colleagues in his plan for a preemptive war with
Spain and left the ministry: yet war broke out anyway.
But why not transfer your attention to two other episodes, which would - I think
- give rather more support to your thesis (which I assume partly derives from
the second Bush presidency?) In spring 1792 the French - constitutional -
monarchy, after the reforms of 1789-91 attacked Austria. One major element, as
most historians would concur, was a campaign by J-P Brissot for power in the
Assembly: look at T.C.W. Blanning's Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars
(London, early 1980s) for full details. Secondly, the three Anglo-Dutch Wars of
the 1650s-70s have a great deal of manoeuvring, of the kind you mention, on
*both* sides, with a Republican regime in the Netherlands but an absolutist one
in England after 1660: here there is a book by J.R. Jones with that title in the
early 1990s.
I suspect that historians are reluctant to embrace monocausal explanations:
something in our nature. But you will find evidence of the kind of domestic
pressure and factional ambition which you want in some of the above episodes.
Best of luck with your researches, and regards
Hamish Scott
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