BYRON NORDSTROM – Ph.D. University of Minnesota – Professor at Gustavus Adolphus College
The 1788 war with Russia seems to be entirely Gustav III's little adventure. A dreamer, an actor. . .perpetually "on stage" and facing rising opposition for his "absolutist" behavior and ignoring of the parliament, a little war (victorious, of course) seemed just what he needed to silence his critics. Of course, things went badly AGAIN. Key Swedish positions were abandoned, a virtual mutiny among officers in Finland (who sought a separate peace with Catherine) occurred, horrific losses in both the army and the navy...did little for his popularity. And yet, he played his cards very well, made the nobility out to be the villains, rammed his Act of Union and Security through the Riksdag, and. . . earned his assassination....
Interesting work you are doing.
Best wishes,
Byron N.
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ANTHONY F. UPTON -- Ph.D. – Professor at St. Andrews University
You are correct regarding all three 18th Century Swedish wars.
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JONAS NORDIN – Ph.D University of Stockholm – Professor at University of Stockholm
When Gustavus III initiated his war against Russia this view had become even more widespread. The attack in 1788 was totally unprovoked and can only be explained by the personal inclination of the King. Since he had no constitutional right to declare war he had to make all the war-planning in secret with only a handful of accomplices. But even they, his closest confidants, were very reluctant and tried by various means to persuade the King to abandon his plans. The reason for war must thus be searched for in the King’s personality. He wanted to deal with a declining popularity and wished to be placed among the former glorious warrior kings on the Swedish throne. The best biography of Gustavus III to this day, written by the late Professor Erik Lönnroth, was titled Den stora rollen, i.e. “the great role”. According to Lönnroth politics was all a stage play to Gustavus III.
When the war eventually broke out there was an almost immediate rebellion among the army officers (nobles, to a large extent) at the front. (The rebellious officers are referred to as Anjalaförbundet, the Anjala league.) And this, I gather, is very interesting to your question. They declared that as officers they had two loyalties: towards the King and towards the People. When those loyalties were in opposition the latter took precedence. Since the war against Russia, however considered, was not in the interest of the people or the common good they were obliged to break their oath of loyalty to the King. Gustavus himself was almost certain that he would be dethroned but was, eventually, saved by a declaration of war from Denmark. Then he could mobilize all his rhetoric and political skill to the mutual defence against Sweden’s centuries-old arch-enemy.
As you sure now Gustavus III was later deadly wounded in an attack at a masked ball in the Stockholm opera house in 1792. Although the assassination was hailed by the French revolutionary gazettes the conspirators were all noblemen. Although the King himself was a great friend of the aristocracy the opposition from this group had been growing constantly throughout his reign. There were certainly many reasons for this, but what really triggered it off was the illegal war. The assassin, Captain Jacob Johan Anckarström, made this clear in a written testimony shortly before his execution:....
Best regards,
Jonas
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H. ARNOLD BARTON – Ph.D. Princeton University – Professor at Southern Illinois University
I am most familiar with Gustaf III's war with Russia. Here the king's internal political motives are clear. The Riksdag (parliament) sessions of 1778 and especially 1786 had revealed widespread and growing opposition to the king's increasingly autocratic regime, especially among the nobility. Candid statements to his confidants (revealed by his correspondence and their diaries and memoirs) show that the king believed a war would restore national unity and his own popularity. Russia was again at war with Turkey and there was great resentment in Poland again the Russians. Sweden attacked but once again disaster seemed imminent until the Swedes' great naval victory over the Russians at Svensksund in 1790 saved the day.
Once the war with Russia ended in 1790, Gustaf began to busy himself with plans to organize a a great European crusade again the revolution in France. Here, too, political factors play a clear role. Again, Gustaf believed a war would rally around him the disaffected Swedish nobility. Nothing came of this plan before the king was assassinated in March 1792, shortly before Austria and Prussia intervened against the French Revolution.
Franklin D.Scott's Sweden: The Nation's History (2nd. ed., Carbondale, IL: 1988), is a good general source. I have written various things about these developments in my book, Scandinavia in the Revolutionary Era, 1760-1815 (1986) and my articles,"Russia and the Problem of Sweden-Finland, 1721-1809," East European Quarterly 5 (1972): 431-55, "Gustav III of Sweden and the East Baltic, 1771-1792," Journal of Baltic Studies 7 (1976): 13-30, and "Gustav III of Sweden and the French Revolution," Personhistorisk tidskrift [Uppsala, Sweden] 89 (1993): 81-101 (the latter two also included in my Essays on Scandinavian History (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 2009).
I hope this may be of some help in your research.
Sincerely,
Arnold Barton
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